

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 11064 01 OF 02 221124Z

45

ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 IO-13 EB-07 AID-05 SAJ-01 SAM-01

ACDA-07 EAE-00 /103 W
----- 102255

P R 221006Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1022

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 11064

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, VN, XE

SUBJECT: JAPANESE ASSESSMENT OF SRV VICE FONMIN PHAN HIEN'S
SE ASIAN TOUR

SUMMARY. IN ANALYSIS OF SRV VICE FONMIN PHAN HIEN'S ROUND
OF SE ASIAN VISITS AND THAI-VIENTAMESE MEETING SET IN HANOI
FOR AUGUST, FONOFF EXPERTS STRESS HANOI'S DESIRE TO BREAK
FROM ISOLATION, IMPROVE IMAGE WITH NON-ALIGNED, AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 11064 01 OF 02 221124Z

OBTAIN ECONOMIC/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AS MAJOR OBJECTIVES.

THEY EMPHASIZE SPECIFIC ASSURANCES ASEAN INTERLOCUTORS OBTAINED OF VIETNAMESE INTENT TO ESCHEW SABRE-RATTLING AND TO DEVOTE ITS ENERGIES TO DOMESTIC RECONSTRUCTION. SPECIFICALLY, HE PROMISED THAT CAPTURED US WEAPONS SHOULD BE USED ONLY TO DEFEND VN AND THAT SOVS WOULD NOT GET BASE THEY SOUGHT AT CAM RANH BAY. JAPANESE ARE PERSUADED THAT HIEN'S HOSTS WERE AS FIRM AND PURPOSEFUL AS THE VIETNAMESE ENVOY; THAT THE TALKS WERE NONETHELESS PRODUCTIVE PERMITS GUARDED OPTIMISM THAT VIETNAM AND ASEAN STATES CAN EVOLVE A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP. A FEW OBSERVERS, MOSTLY IN HANOI, SEE MOSCOW BEHIND HANOI'S MOVE. END SUMMARY.

1. ASSURANCES REQUIRED OF SRV VICE FONMIN PHAN HEIN BY ASEAN LEADERS WERE AS IMPORTANT AS HIEN'S OWN GOALS DURING HIS SE ASIAN TOUR, IN ANALYSIS OF FONOFF FIRST SE ASIA DIVDIR ITO. DUBBING HIS ASSESSMENT PERSONAL, ITO LISTED FOUR GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND TWO SPECIFIC GOALS PHAN HIEN SOUGHT IN KL, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA, AND MANILA. GENERALLY, HIEN SOUGHT (A) TO EMPHASIZE THAT UNIFIED VIETNAM WILL DEVOTE ITSELF TO RECONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING OF VN; (B) TO ANNOUNCE THAT VN WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (ITO ASSUMES THIS INCLUDES THAILAND); (C) TO DEMONSTRATE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST STATES; (D) WITH COLOMBO CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED IN VIEW, TO IMPROVE VN'S THIRD WORLD IMAGE.

2. AMONG SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, HIEN SOUGHT, UNDER THE RUBRIC OF VIETNAMESE ACCEPTANCE OF ASEAN'S GOAL OF NEUTRALISM, TO EVOKE SPECIFIC PLEDGES THAT ASEAN IS NOT A MILITARY ARRANGEMENT AND WILL NOT BECOME SO. SECONDLY, HIEN ATTEMPTED TO ENCOURAGE AND ARRANGE TRADE WITH AND ECONOMIC/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE STATES VISITED.

3. ITO FOUND IT SIGNIFICANT AND BENEFICIAL THAT HIEN'S HOSTS CONSTRAINED HIM TO ANSWER CRITICISM, CHARGES AND DOUBTS DIRECTED AT THE SRV. WITHOUT IDENTIFYING WITH WHICH LEADERS THE CONVERSATIONS TOOK
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 11064 01 OF 02 221124Z

PLACE, ITO CITED FOUR OCCASIONS WHERE HIEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS WHICH DRIVE CLOSE TO THE HEART OF ASEAN CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR REVOLUTIONARY NEIGHBOR. AMONG HIEN'S REPLIES (NOT NECESSARILY REPORTED AT EACH STOP): (A) HIEN PROMISED THAT AMERICAN WEAPONRY LEFT BEHIND IN VN WOULD BE USED ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND NOT SUPPORT INSURGENCIES ELSEWHERE. (B) VN WILL NOT RPT NOT GIVE THE SOVIETS A BASE AT CAM RANH BAY, ALTHOUGH

THE RUSSIANS HAVE SOUGHT SUCH FACILITIES. (C) PROVIDED ASEAN IS GENUINELY NEUTRALIST, SRV MAY AT SOME FUTURE STAGE CONSIDER JOINING THE ASEAN ORGANIZATION. (D) AS A COROLLARY TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT USING FOREIGN BASES FOR ATTACK AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES, THE SRV AGREES THAT SOLDIERS STATIONED IN OTHER COUNTRIES OUGHT NOT BE USED AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES. (HIS INTERLOCUTOR OF COURSE MEANT THAT VIETNAMESE TROOPS STATIONED IN LAOS WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST THAILAND).

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 11064 02 OF 02 221137Z

45

ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 IO-13 EB-07 AID-05 SAJ-01 SAM-01

ACDA-07 EAE-00 /103 W

----- 102438

P R 221006Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1023

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 11064

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

4. AS OVERALL CONCLUSIONS, ITO EXPRESSED OPINION

THAT UNIFIED VIETNAM HAS MUCH MORE QUICKLY THAN ANTICIPATED MODIFIED ITS ATTITUDE IF NOT ITS POLICIES. CHANGE MAY BE TACTICAL RATHER THAN STRATEGIC, BUT JAPAN WELCOMES THIS MORE MODERATE, CONCILIATORY APPROACH FROM HANOI. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE US DOES AS WELL, WHICH WE CONFIRMED. HE NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS ALSO HAVE EXPRESSED APPROVAL BUT THUS FAR THE CHINESE HAVE MAINTAINED SILENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 11064 02 OF 02 221137Z

5. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, ASIA REGIONAL POLICY DIVDIR NISHIYAMA EMPHASIZED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF HANOI'S DECISION TO BEHAVE IN MORE CONCILIATORY FASHION TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBORS. IN BACKGROUND OF HIEN MISSION, NISHIYAMA IS INTERESTED IN WHAT ROLE SOVIETS MAY HAVE PLAYED. JAPANESE FIRST SECRETARY IMAGAWA, WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM HANOI, CONVEYED TO NISHIYAMA KEEN DISAPPOINTMENT THAT RUSSIANS SEEM TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER HANOI'S POLICIES. IMAGAWA TOLD NISHIYAMA THAT EVERY PRONOUNCEMENT IN HANOI ALMOST INVARIABLY INCLUDES STRONG PRAISE OF SOVIETS FOR MOSCOW'S AID DURING LAST STAGES OF VN WAR. IMAGAWA BELIEVES THIS FEELING OF INDEPTEDNESS TRANSLATES INTO INFLUENCE OVER HANOI'S POLICIES. PRC DIPLOMATS, IMAGAWA SAID, CONSTANTLY CRITICIZE THE DEGREE MOSCOW DOMINATES VN'S POLICIES. NISHIYAMA HIMSELF PLAYS DOWN THE RUSSIAN ROLE SOMEWHAT. HE BELIEVES HIEN'S VISIT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER POLICY STATEMENTS, TO EFFECT THAT HANOI WAS WILLING TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ITS ASEAN NEIGHBORS IF THEY WERE GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRALIST. VIETNAMESE CERTAINLY CONSULTED RUSSIANS AHEAD OF TIME, BUT NISHIYAMA BELIEVES IN GENERAL HANOI FOLLOWS NATIONALISTIC AND HIGHLY PRAGMATIC POLICIES. HE REGARDS HIEN'S MISSION AS A REALISTIC AND DEFT ATTEMPT (A) TO BREAK THE SRV FROM ISOLATION IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF IN ASIA AND AT SAME TIME BOOST ITS CREDENTIALS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED; AND (B) TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PERHAPS LATER ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES FROM RELATIONS WITH OTHER ASEANS. AS A POSSIBLE UNDERLYING MOTIVE, NISHIYAMA SAID HANOI IS WELL AWARE OF PRES FORD'S REMARKS IN HONOLULU. ELEMENT OF VIETNAMESE DECISION TO MODERATE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN STATES MAY BE DESIRE TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE BEHAVING TOWARD THEIR NEIGHBORS, AS PRES FORD URGED.

6. AS FOR IMPACT ON JAPANESE POLICY, NISHIYAMA SAID JAPAN HEARTILY WELCOMES THIS MORE ACCOMMODATING

ATMOSPHERE AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO PLAY ANY
ROLE POSSIBLE IN FACILITATING UNDERSTANDING AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 11064 02 OF 02 221137Z

COOPERATION IN THE AREA.

7. COMMENT: WE ARE STRUCK ALSO BY THE PROMISES ASEAN
OFFICIALS AND LEADERS EXTRACTED FROM HIEN. WHETHER
HANOI WILL LIVE UP TO THEM IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO
DOUBT BUT STANDARDS HAVE BEEN SPELLED OUT AGAINST
WHICH HANOI'S FUTURE BEHAVIOR CAN BE MEASURED.

8. WHILE HANOI'S CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE MAY BE
TACTICAL, LINES OF COMMUNICATION HAVE BEEN OPENED,
THE WAY PREPARED FOR EXCHANGE OF GOODS, SERVICES
AND PERSONS, AND THE NECESSITIES FOR ACCOMMODATION
ESTABLISHED. REGARDLESS OF HANOI'S LONG-TERM
STRATEGY, THESE NEW MODALITIES IN THEMSELVES, IT SEEMS
TO US, PROVIDE SOME BASIS FOR VERY GUARDED OPTIMISM.
SHOESMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: REPORTS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MINISTERIAL VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976TOKYO11064
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760282-0277
From: TOKYO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760730/aaaabamf.tel
Line Count: 247
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 APR 2004 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <19 AUG 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: JAPANESE ASSESSMENT OF SRV VICE FONMIN PHAN HIEN'S SE ASIAN TOUR
TAGS: PFOR, VN, XE, JA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006